



Secret



25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Secret

50

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

14 November 1968

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

No. 0313/68
14 November 1968

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

East Germany - Berlin: The East Germans are floating rumors that they will further restrict travel to Berlin. (Page 2)

Czechoslovakia: The leadership probably will make new concessions to Moscow. (Page 4)

25X1


Ecuador: The president would like to establish diplomatic ties with most European Communist countries. (Page 7)

Pakistan: The arrest of ex-foreign minister Bhutto could spark further disorder. (Page 8)

USSR: Press attacks against the US Sixth Fleet are another assertion of Moscow's claim to be a Mediterranean power. (Page 9)

Antigua: Labor demonstrations (Page 10)

SECRET



SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

[South Vietnam: The Communists on 12-13 November shelled nearly 20 villages and allied military installations in South Vietnam. This was the heaviest bombardment in any 24-hour period since 1 November.

The greatest concentration of attacks fell in II Corps, where more than 275 rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds were fired. The base camp of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade at Camp Radcliffe in Binh Dinh Province was the hardest hit--by 151 rounds. Other significant military objectives struck included the airfields at Pleiku city (Camp Holloway) and Ban Me Thuot, and three fire support bases near the Cambodian border in Pleiku and Kontum provinces.

The district towns of Tieu Can and Kien Long in the Mekong Delta, along with at least five hamlets and villages in other portions of central and southern South Vietnam, also came under Communist fire.

25X1

14 Nov 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

East Germany - Berlin: The East Germans are floating rumors that they will further restrict the travel of West Germans and West Berliners to and from West Berlin.

Various East German functionaries claim that Pankow's failure to move against last week's convention of the Christian Democratic Union does not preclude some future East German measures. A Soviet Embassy official has also implied that the East Germans would invoke new, unspecified restrictions.

West German officials speculate that the East German Volkskammer on 15 November will decree new visa regulations which will require West Germans and West Berliners to apply to East German authorities in advance for visas to travel through East Germany. At present, the East Germans issue visas to West Germans at the border upon application. Bonn also believes the East Germans may place restrictions on certain Berlin manufactures which Pankow claims are illegal military goods.

The East Germans already control various aspects of West German travel to and from Berlin, and could easily invoke other controls on 15 November or at some future date. In leaking the intention to do so this week, they probably want to test the West German and Western Allies' reaction, and to foment friction among them. East Germany's ultimate goals in imposing new restrictions would be to provide further "evidence" that it is a sovereign state, and to force Bonn into accepting Pankow as an equal partner in negotiating these and other issues.

High West German officials have reacted to rumors of new Berlin access restrictions with concern, and have called on the Allies to sound a warning note to the Soviets.

(continued)

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

The Soviets are likely to remain in the background. They can be expected to defend Pankow's actions as a justified response to West German "provocations" in Berlin, and to parry Western protests by disclaiming responsibility on the grounds that Allied access is not affected.

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

Czechoslovakia: The party leadership probably will make new concessions to Moscow, and lose more popular support in the process.

At its plenum opening today, the central committee will consider a document drafted by the Dubcek leadership which calls for steps to conform more closely to Moscow's interpretation of "normalization."

Prague has already made major moves in this direction. Immediately prior to the plenum, the leadership restricted foreign travel, expelled some foreign correspondents, sternly warned against further anti-Soviet demonstrations, and suspended some leading publications critical of the Soviets.

The party's suspension of its own magazine, Politika, suggests that a majority of the party presidium is becoming more susceptible to Moscow's pressures, and may be reluctant to continue to support major aspects of Dubcek's liberalization program.

Furthermore, there are indications that conservatives may be about to gain a large measure of control over Czechoslovak mass media. According to an unconfirmed press report, Karel Hoffmann, former telecommunications minister who cooperated with the Soviets during and after the intervention, is slated to become director of the government information office, which censors the press, radio, and television. Two pro-Soviet hard-liners reportedly will also be designated directors of Czechoslovak radio and television.

The plenum may also announce some changes in the top leadership. Liberal party presidium members and party secretaries Mlynar and Spacek are said to be disillusioned by concessions to the Russians, and at least Mlynar's resignation may be presented to the meeting. Party conservatives are expected to make a strong bid to have their representatives included in the leadership.

(continued)

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

Czechoslovak young people, concerned over the outcome of the plenum, have threatened to demonstrate throughout the country if the decisions taken by the central committee are "too favorable" to the pro-Soviet conservatives. Student leaders already are planning to strike and hold new street demonstrations on 17 November even though Dubcek and other top leaders have warned that any disturbances will be put down with force.

Some Czechoslovak troops are in a high state of readiness to help control disorder

25X1

The Czechoslovak Army is being reduced by 20,000 troops,

25X1
25X1

the reduction would involve only support personnel and would not affect the number of tactical units. A reduction in the size of the 195,000-man armed forces was reportedly planned by the Czechoslovak Government prior to the intervention by Warsaw Pact forces, but the size of the cut planned then is not known.

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

Ecuador: President Velasco apparently would like to establish diplomatic relations with most of the Communist countries of Europe.

A protocol establishing relations with Rumania was signed on 11 November, along with a revision of an existing trade agreement, during Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu's stop in Quito. A Czechoslovak consul general arrived in Ecuador on 5 November, signaling the advance of relations from a trade mission level. The Quito press said that he would discuss the restoration of diplomatic relations, which were broken in 1962. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

Before he took office Velasco indicated that he would seek markets in Communist countries to improve Ecuador's income. Sales of cacao to the USSR and bananas to all of Eastern Europe in 1968 have been large enough to encourage this approach. The Ecuadoreans seem content to worry later about the economic and political problems such trade usually involves. [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

~~SECRET~~

Pakistan: The arrest of ex - foreign minister Bhutto and 14 collaborators yesterday could spark further antigovernment disorder.

The arrests came in the midst of Bhutto's political tour of West Pakistan which had aroused popular discontent and helped touch off the most serious antigovernment riots since Ayub Khan seized power in 1958. Bhutto, noted for his anti-Americanism and hard line toward India, has been a thorn in President Ayub's side since his removal as foreign minister in mid-1966.

Bhutto became a particular problem after he formed his opposition People's Party in late November 1967 and announced that he planned to run for president in 1970. Although his increasingly vehement antigovernment speeches throughout the country had failed to gain him a significant following, they stimulated some open opposition to the government among students and intellectuals who were already unhappy with Ayub.

The government's action could make a martyr of Bhutto. Although the student rioting of the past week--increasingly antigovernment in nature--has largely subsided in the major cities, tension remains high. Nevertheless, Ayub continues to enjoy the confidence of the army and appears to retain over-all control of the political situation.

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

USSR: Recent Soviet press attacks against the US Sixth Fleet are the latest assertion of Moscow's claim to be considered as a Mediterranean power.

Two Soviet newspapers have carried lengthy articles this week calling for the "liquidation" of the American military presence in the Mediterranean, referring to the US as a "club-carrying gendarme." Red Star, the military organ, warned that the USSR could not remain indifferent to the intrigues being organized near its borders.

Soviet statements have gradually come to focus more sharply on the US naval presence, rather than on the Soviet squadron's role as a defender of Arab interests. Current NATO activities--including maneuvers in the Mediterranean--probably inspired the recent articles, and Moscow might also want to remind the Mediterranean countries that it has a stake in the area. In any event, Moscow clearly aims to keep the subject before Soviet and foreign public opinion.

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

NOTE

Antigua: Political rivalry between Premier Bird and the growing labor opposition is highlighted by plans for a large demonstration today to protest the serious unemployment situation. Although British officials do not anticipate violence, continuing demonstrations could have a detrimental effect on the winter tourist trade, which is now the island's major industry. During the past year the Antigua Workers Union has become the dominant political force, having won the congressional by-elections in August, and it now appears destined to supplant the Bird government.

25X1

14 Nov 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

10

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012500090001-3

Secret

Secret